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Debates about reforming or repealing various provisions of the Dodd-Frank
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank) have echoed
throughout Congress since the bill became law.
Momentum picked up after the 2016 elections, but
attempts at changing key features of the law always
have been largely one-sided. In early December,
however, the Senate Banking Committee advanced the
“Economic Growth, Regulatory Relief and Consumer
Protection Act,” S. 2155, to the full Senate. This bill
met with bipartisan accord in the committee led by
Chairman Mike Crapo (R-ID), with seven Republicans and nine Democrats supporting its advancement.1 S. 2155 contains policies that would amend,
roll back, or eliminate key parts from Dodd-Frank.
While this may simply be the next swing in a series of
financial industry reform misses, the bipartisan nature
of this particular bill’s support is notable given Congress’s recent history in this arena.
In the summer of 2017, the briefly-but-highly
scrutinized Financial CHOICE Act advanced out
of the House Financial Services Committee and was
passed by the House, in both instances along strictly
partisan lines.2 Lacking enough support in the Senate, the bill has yet to reach the floor. That bill seeks,
among other things, to repeal the Volcker Rule and
to drastically scale back the regulatory authority of
the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB).

SUMMARY
• One of the key features of the Dodd-Frank Act is that it imposes
specific and costly regulatory requirements on banks that cross
the threshold of having more than $10 billion in total assets.
• Anecdotal accounts have suggested that this threshold has led
to increased consolidation in the banking industry. This brief
provides new statistical evidence of that phenomenon. Banks
that approach the $10 billion threshold are significantly more
likely to engage in an acquisition, pay more for that acquisition, and acquire bigger target banks than similar banking
institutions did prior to Dodd-Frank.
• As banks approach the $10 billion threshold and become subject to heightened regulation under Dodd-Frank, the evidence
suggests that banks engage in an acquisition so as to improve
their financial position. The fact that the costs of regulatory
compliance do not vary significantly with total assets not only
reinforces this incentive for acquisition, but makes it all the
more desirable to acquire larger target banks.
• To the extent that policymakers are concerned with further
consolidation in the banking industry, these findings should be
of interest as they continue to evaluate current regulations and
develop new ones, which might include the use of bright line
asset thresholds that impose requirements with fixed compliance costs.
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Comparatively, the scope of S. 2155
is more modest. One of its primary
provisions is the proposal to raise the
asset threshold at which a bank holding company is considered a “systemically important financial institution”
(SIFI) from $50 billion to $250 billion, and to exempt all banks with less
than $100 billion in assets (up from
$10 billion) from federal stress tests.3
As policymakers debate the merits of
such threshold changes, the lessons
learned from the imposition of regulatory thresholds under Dodd-Frank
could be instructive.
Currently, under Dodd-Frank,
there are three particular requirements
that are only imposed on banks with
more than $10 billion in total assets:
(1) regulatory oversight by the CFPB,
which includes quarterly assessments,
(2) the requirement to perform and
report the results of annual companyrun stress tests (Dodd-Frank Act
Stress Tests, or DFASTs), and (3) the
Durbin Amendment, which restricts
debit card interchange fees.4 In our
research, we have discovered that
these threshold-based regulatory
requirements affect the acquisition
activity of banks around those thresholds. Specifically, we find that, in order
to maintain relatively stable financial
metrics (e.g., ROA) when suddenly

THE ACQUISITION
MOTIVATION

subjected to the costs of stress tests
and CFPB oversight, banks approaching the current $10 billion asset
threshold are much more likely to
engage in an acquisition (+62%), pay
more for that acquisition (+42%), and
acquire bigger target banks (+52%),
compared to the pre-Dodd-Frank
period. In short, bright line thresholds have increased consolidation
in the banking industry. Although
the financial press and analysts have
highlighted anecdotal cases of this
behavior,5 this Issue Brief discusses
new statistical evidence showing that
consolidation is a more widespread
phenomenon.6
Our focus on acquisition activity
in the banking industry is relevant
given recent interest in consolidation
at both the top of the industry, leading
to banks that are “too big to fail,” and
at the bottom of the industry, leading to the disappearance of smaller
regional and community banks that
serve important segments in the
United States.7 With big changes to
Dodd-Frank potentially on the horizon, it is important for policymakers to be mindful of how bright line
thresholds may affect bank behavior in
ways that may not be desirable from a
public policy perspective.

When banks cross the $10 billion
threshold and incur the additional
compliance costs associated with the
new regulations (e.g., expenditures
on new software, consultants, and
employee salaries), their financial
statement ratios, such as ROA or Tier
1 capital, will be negatively affected.
Because many of the new compliance
costs do not vary significantly with
total assets, engaging in an acquisition
will not greatly increase them.8 Banks
engage in acquisitions for a number
of different reasons, but a common
thread among them is the desire to
improve their financial performance,
which is often assessed through
financial statement ratios. Thus, the
decision to engage in an acquisition
often involves a comparison between
a bank’s current financial position and
the projected financial position following an acquisition. We argue that
the fixed nature of the compliance
costs coupled with the focus on financial statement ratios results in stronger
incentives for banks right around the
threshold to engage in an acquisition,
and the data reflect this (see Figure 1).
These incentives can manifest in
at least two different forms. First, the

NOTES
The Hill, “Senate panel moves forward with bill to roll
back Dodd-Frank,” available at http://thehill.com/policy/
finance/363404-senate-panel-moves-forward-with-billto-roll-back-dodd-frank.
2 HousingWire, “Senate Banking Committee introduces
repeal of Dodd-Frank Act,” available at https://www.housingwire.com/articles/42010-senate-banking-committeeintroduces-repeal-of-dodd-frank-act.
3 Supra note 1.
4 The finalized regulation includes two different stress testing
requirements: “company-run” stress tests (DFASTs) and
1

“supervisory” stress tests. Mid-sized institutions, defined
as those with total assets between $10 and $50 billion, are
only required to conduct annual company-run stress tests,
which involve assessing the sensitivity of bank health to
several different scenarios issued by the Federal Reserve.
5 Bloomberg, “Small Banks Feel the Urge to Merge,”
available at https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-10-03/dodd-frank-fills-small-banks-with-theurge-to-merge.
6 The primary source for this Issue Brief is our paper
“Regulatory Asset Thresholds and Acquisition Activity in the
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Banking Industry.”
Lux and Greene (2015).
8 The Durbin Amendment, which restricts debit card interchange fees, is another significant cost imposed on banks
with more than $10 billion in total assets. However, the
costs associated with this requirement are less likely to
be purely fixed. Given our focus on fixed costs, we do not
discuss the Durbin Amendment in detail here.
9 The increased costs resulting from CFPB oversight primarily involve consultant work related to information technology
systems, as well as operating costs related to disclosures,
7
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FIGURE 1 PERCENT OF BANK-QUARTER OBSERVATIONS BY ASSET SIZE
(IN BILLIONS)
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E.g., roughly 21% of bank-quarter observations in the pre-Dodd-Frank period have end of quarter total assets between $5 and $6 billion
Summary: The increased willingness by banks right around the $10 billion threshold to pay for acquisitions not only results in an
observed increase in deal premiums, but also an increase in the probability that a threshold bank wins the bid for potential target
banks, thus increasing the observed number of acquisitions made by these post-Dodd-Frank threshold banks.

negative impact of the compliance
costs on financial statement ratios will
lower the benchmark against which
potential targets will be compared and
will make some previously unattractive
targets look better to banks imme-

diately surrounding the threshold.
Second, banks that were already attractive targets absent the new compliance
costs now become more attractive
to banks right around the threshold,
potentially increasing their willingness

NOTES
back office support, and error resolutions. The largest costs
from stress testing result from the implementation of new
software and data collection systems, as well as expenses
for consultants and other employees. In addition, banks
must publicly disclose the stress test results.
10 Smith (2016).
11 Dobbs (2017).
12 Gao et al. (2009).
13 Forbes, “Ranking America’s 100 Largest Banks,” available at https://www.forbes.com/sites/kurtbadenhausen/2017/01/10/full-list-ranking-americas-100-largest-

banks/#14fabe434c5a.
there are 45 banks with total assets between $10
and $25 billion and another 18 banks with total assets
between $25 and $50 billion. See Forbes, ibid.

14 Notably,
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to pay for those targets. Collectively, we
argue that this increases the demand
for acquisitions by banks approaching
and just above the threshold, which
results in an increase in both the number of acquisitions completed by the
threshold banks and the deal premiums
associated with those acquisitions.
Although it is challenging to
explicitly quantify the fixed compliance costs, there is anecdotal evidence
regarding the size banks need to grow
to in order to “absorb” the additional
costs.9 In a recent article, one report
states that “a bank that crosses the $10
billion threshold will probably need
to grow its assets to at least $12 billion to get ‘an appropriate return.’”10
This estimate is consistent with recent
acquisitions involving banks surrounding the threshold. For example,
Berkshire Hills Bancorp recently
announced the acquisition of Commerce Bancshares, which will take the
bank from $9.3 billion in total assets
to about $12 billion. The CEO states
that “the Commerce acquisition would
enable Berkshire to ‘fully absorb’ the
impacts of crossing the $10 billion
threshold.”11 Although anecdotal in
nature, this discussion suggests that the
additional costs result in the need for
banks to grow to approximately $12
billion in total assets.
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THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF
THRESHOLD-INCENTIVIZED
MERGERS
We compared changes in acquisition
activity for bank-quarters in the asset
range of $9 to $12 billion in a preDodd-Frank-period (2003-2008) to
similar activity for bank-quarters in
the same asset range in a post-period
(2011-2016). This allowed us to control for other costs and benefits associated with the acquisition decision for
banks in this size range that would
reasonably remain constant from the
pre- to post-period (e.g., the direct
costs of acquisitions).
We documented an increase in the
likelihood of engaging in an acquisition for a treatment group from the
pre-period to the post-period relative to the same change for a control
group. The marginal effect was an
increase of 5.7 percentage points
in the likelihood of engaging in an
acquisition, which corresponds to
an increase of 62% compared to the
unconditional probability of engaging in an acquisition for the treatment
group. In our second test, we examined the amount of goodwill that was
generated from an acquisition as a
measure of the deal premium, because
a majority of the target banks in our
sample were private. We discovered an
increase in the proportion of the deal
value that was recorded as goodwill
for acquisitions by the treatment
group relative to those by the control
group after the passage of the new
regulations. The economic magnitude
corresponds to a 42% increase in the
“goodwill to deal value” ratio for the
average acquisition in our treatment
group. Simply put, the increase in both

the quantity of acquisitions and the
price at which those acquisitions were
executed is consistent with an increase
in the demand for acquisitions by
banks that were affected by the significant increase in compliance costs.
To provide further support that
the increased acquisition activity was
associated with the new compliance
costs, we performed an additional test
that examined the relative size of the
target bank to the acquiring bank.
Holding all else equal, we hypothesized that an acquisition of a relatively larger target bank would more
effectively mitigate the negative effects
from crossing the threshold than
would the acquisition of a smaller
target bank. We tested this prediction
by examining the relative size of the
target bank to the acquiring bank for
the subset of banks in our sample that
completed an acquisition. Consistent
with our predictions, we found that
the treatment group increased the relative size of the target banks from the
pre-period to the post-period relative
to the same change for control group
acquisitions. In terms of economic
magnitude, the increase in the relative size corresponds to approximately
52% of the average relative size for the
treatment group. This provides supplementary evidence that the increased
demand for acquisitions documented
in our main tests was indeed driven by
the new regulatory compliance costs.

THE ALTERNATE PATH:
STAYING BELOW THE
THRESHOLD
Although our main analyses focus on
banks with incentives to engage in
acquisition activity, we acknowledged
4

that implementing regulations only
on banks above an asset threshold
may also have resulted in some banks
taking actions in an effort to remain
below the threshold to avoid the regulatory compliance costs altogether.
Prior research documents evidence
consistent with this behavior in other
settings,12 but we performed an
additional test to assess whether this
behavior also existed in our setting.
Specifically, we examined the demand
for deposits by a treatment group
with total assets between $8 and $10
billion and compared their changes
to a control group. We focused on
the deposit mechanism, since each
dollar of deposits that a bank accepts
increases the amount of assets on their
balance sheet and because customer
deposits finance a majority of bank
assets. Our results suggest that some
banks below the threshold decreased
both the growth rate on their deposit
accounts and the interest rate paid on
those accounts after the announcement of the new regulations, relative
to the same changes for a control
group. Taken together, these findings
are consistent with a decrease in the
demand for deposits by banks just
below the regulatory asset threshold
after passage of the new regulations,
corroborating the findings in earlier
studies that examine different settings
and mechanisms.

ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS
FOR THE INCREASE IN
ACQUISITIONS
One explanation for the increase in
acquisitions is that there are certain
bank types (i.e., “serial” acquirers)
that differentially enter the treatment
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and control groups in the pre- versus
post-periods. Thus, it might be the
selection of bank types that explains
our results rather than the compliance
costs. We performed two different
tests to address this concern, but the
results from these tests are consistent
with the main results, indicating that
certain bank types do not appear to
drive our results.
A second explanation is that some
other concurrent event (e.g., the financial crisis) drove our results, rather
than the compliance costs associated
with the regulation. Importantly, our
use of a control group mitigates this
concern. Our design would not fully
rule this out if there was an event
occurring at the same point in time
that differentially affected the treatment and control groups. But after
additional tests, we found that our
results continue to hold across these
different specifications.
A final concern is that even
though the regulations surrounding
Dodd-Frank may be the driver of the
behavior we document, there could
be a different part of the regulation
that is driving results. Alternatively, it
could be the case that complying with
the additional requirements results in
benefits to the bank that make acquisitions more attractive. This is unlikely
to be a significant concern, however,

given that we perform our tests using
a group of control banks that are only
larger than the treatment banks. Thus,
the control group is subject to the
same regulations and would presumably experience the same benefits as
the treatment group. This leaves the
primary difference between these two
groups as the extent to which fixed
compliance costs affect bank financial
statement ratios.

REGULATORY TAKEAWAYS
Our findings should be of interest to regulators and policymakers
as they evaluate current regulations
and implement new ones, which
might include the use of bright line
asset thresholds that impose requirements with fixed compliance costs.
It is important to note that we do
not argue that the evidence we have
presented indicates that bright line
thresholds in regulation should be
discontinued or that the acquisitions
made by banks after the implementation of the new regulations are inefficient choices. Instead, we contend that
the potential for increased acquisition
activity warrants consideration in
evaluating the overall effect of these
types of regulations.
The proposal of a $100 billion
asset threshold for stress tests under S.

5

2155 appears to take the costs of complying with regulations into account,
offering relief to banks approaching
the $10 billion threshold. There are
only 18 banks with more than $100
billion in total assets, and none have
total assets in the $80 to $100 billion
range (as of early 2017).13 Furthermore, banks approaching a new $100
billion asset threshold in the future
may not be similarly inclined to
search for acquisition targets to vault
over the threshold, because the costs
of complying with regulatory oversight are largely fixed and likely would
have a much smaller impact on bank
financial ratios, relative to the impact
on a $10 billion bank. In other words,
bright line regulatory thresholds
should not significantly affect acquisition decisions for the country’s biggest
banks. But Congress could consider
alternative thresholds for triggering
mandatory stress tests (e.g., $25 or
$50 billion) or layering regulatory
requirements (i.e., setting different
thresholds for stress tests and CFPB
oversight).14 To the extent that policymakers are concerned with further
consolidation in the banking industry,
they can now consider the effects that
bright line asset thresholds have had
in recent years when deciding how to
make changes for the future.
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